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Cancer and the Constitution — Choice at Life’s End
George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H.
J.M. Coetzee’s violent, anti­apartheid Age of Iron, 
a novel the Wall Street Journal termed “a fierce pag­
eant of modern South Africa,” is written as a let­
ter by a retired classics professor, Mrs. Curren, 
to her daughter, who lives in the United States. 
Mrs. Curren is dying of cancer, and her daughter 
advises her to come to the United States for treat­
ment. She replies, “I can’t afford to die in Amer­
ica. . . . No one can, except Americans.” 1 Dying 
of cancer has been considered a “hard death” for 
at least a century, unproven and even quack rem­
edies have been common, and price has been a 
secondary consideration. Efforts sponsored by the 
federal government to find cures for cancer date 
from the establishment of the National Cancer 
Institute (NCI) in 1937. Cancer research was in­
tensified after President Richard Nixon’s decla­
ration of a “war on cancer” and passage of the 
National Cancer Act of 1971.2 Most recently, 
calls for more cancer research have followed the 
announcement by Elizabeth Edwards, wife of pres­
idential candidate John Edwards, that her cancer 
is no longer considered curable.
Frustration with the methods and slow prog­
ress of mainstream medical research has helped 
fuel a resistance movement that distrusts both 
conventional medicine and government and that 
has called for the recognition of a right for ter­
minally ill patients with cancer to have access to 
any drugs they want to take. Prominent examples 
include the popularity of Krebiozen in the 1950s 
and of laetrile in the 1970s. As an NCI spokes­
person put it more than 20 years ago, when thou­
sands of people were calling the NCI hotline 
pleading for access to interleukin­2, “What the 
callers are saying is, ‘Our mother, our brother, 
our sister is dying at this very moment. We have 
nothing to lose.’”2 Today, families search the In­
ternet for clinical trials, and even untested chem­
icals such as dichloroacetate, that seem to offer 
them some hope. In addition, basing advocacy on 
their personal experiences with cancer, many 
families have focused their frustrations on the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which they 
see as a government agency denying them access 
to treatments they need.
In May 2006 these families won an apparent 
major victory when the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia, in the case of Abigail Alli-
ance v. Von Eschenbach (hereafter referred to as Abigail 
Alliance),3 agreed with their argument that patients 
with cancer have a constitutional right of access 
to investigational cancer drugs. In reaction, the 
FDA began the process of rewriting its own regu­
lations to make it easier for terminally ill patients 
not enrolled in clinical trials to have access to 
investigational drugs.4 In November 2006, the 
full bench of the Court of Appeals vacated the 
May 2006 opinion, and the case was reheard in 
March 2007.5 The decision of the full bench, ex­
pected by the fall, will hinge on the answer to a 
central question: Do terminally ill adult patients 
with cancer for whom there are no effective treat­
ments have a constitutional right of access to in­
vestigational drugs their physicians think might 
be beneficial?
the constitutional controversy
The Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Devel­
opmental Drugs (hereafter called the Abigail Alli­
ance) sued the FDA to prevent it from enforcing 
its policy of prohibiting the sale of drugs that had 
not been proved safe and effective to competent 
adult patients who are terminally ill and have no 
alternative treatment options. The Abigail Alli­
ance is named after Abigail Burroughs, whose 
squamous­cell carcinoma of the head and neck 
was diagnosed when she was only 19 years old. 
Two years later, in 2001, she died. Before her 
death she had tried unsuccessfully to obtain in­
vestigational drugs on a compassionate use basis 
from ImClone and AstraZeneca and was accepted 
for a clinical trial only shortly before her death. 
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Her father founded the Abigail Alliance in her 
memory.6
The district court dismissed the Abigail Alli­
ance lawsuit. The appeals court, in a two­to­one 
opinion written by Judge Judith Rogers, who was 
joined by Judge Douglas Ginsburg, reversed the 
decision. It concluded that competent, terminally 
ill adult patients have a constitutional “right to 
access to potentially life­saving post­Phase I in­
vestigational new drugs, upon a doctor’s advice, 
even where that medicine carries risks for the pa­
tient,” and remanded the case to the district court 
to determine whether the FDA’s current policy 
violated that right.3
the right to life
The appeals court found that the relevant consti­
tutional right was determined by the due­process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment: “no person shall 
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property with­
out due process of law.” In the court’s words, the 
narrow question presented by Abigail Alliance is 
whether the due­process clause “protects the right 
of terminally ill patients to make an informed de­
cision that may prolong life, specifically by use 
of potentially life­saving new drugs that the FDA 
has yet to approve for commercial marketing but 
that the FDA has determined, after Phase I clini­
cal human trials, are safe enough for further test­
ing on a substantial number of human beings.”3
The court answered yes, finding that this right 
has deep legal roots in the right to self­defense, 
and that “Barring a terminally ill patient from 
the use of a potentially life­saving treatment im­
pinges on this right of self­preservation.”3 In a 
footnote, the court restated this proposition: “The 
fundamental right to take action, even risky ac­
tion, free from government interference, in order 
to save one’s own life undergirds the court’s de­
cision.”3 The court relied primarily on the Cruzan 
case,7 in which the Supreme Court recognized 
the right of a competent adult to refuse life­sus­
taining treatment, including a feeding tube:
The logical corollary is that an individual 
must also be free to decide for herself 
whether to assume any known or unknown 
risks of taking a medication that might pro­
long her life. Like the right claimed in Cruzan, 
the right claimed by the [Abigail] Alliance 
to be free of FDA imposition does not in­
volve treatment by the government or a 
government subsidy. Rather, much as the 
guardians of the comatose [sic] patient in 
Cruzan did, the Alliance seeks to have the 
government step aside by changing its pol­
icy so the individual right of self­determi­
nation is not violated.3
The appeals court concluded that the Supreme 
Court’s 1979 unanimous decision on laetrile,8 in 
which the Court concluded that Congress had 
made no exceptions in the FDA law for termi­
nally ill cancer patients, was not relevant because 
laetrile had never been studied in a phase 1 trial 
and because the Court did not address the ques­
tion of whether terminally ill cancer patients have 
a constitutional right to take whatever drugs their 
physicians prescribe.
the dissent
Judge Thomas Griffith, the dissenting judge, ar­
gued that the suggested constitutional right sim­
ply does not exist. He noted, for example, that the 
self­defense cases relied on are examples of “ab­
stract concepts of personal autonomy,” and can­
not be used to craft new rights. As to the nation’s 
history and traditions, he concluded that the 
FDA’s drug­regulatory efforts have been reasona­
ble responses “to new risks as they are present­
ed.”3 Accepting his argument leaves the majority 
resting squarely on Cruzan and the laetrile case. 
As to Cruzan, the dissent argued that “A tradition 
of protecting individual freedom from life­saving, 
but forced, medical treatment does not evidence 
a constitutional tradition of providing affirma­
tive access to a potentially harmful, even fatal, 
commercial good.”3 As to the laetrile case, the 
judge noted simply that the Court had agreed 
with the FDA that, “For the terminally ill, as for 
anyone else, a drug is unsafe if its potential for 
inflicting death or physical injury is not offset by 
the possibility of therapeutic benefit.”3,8
Finally, the dissenting judge argued that if the 
new constitutional right were accepted, it was too 
vague to be applied only to terminally ill patients 
seeking drugs that had been tested in phase 1 tri­
als. Specifically, the judge asked, must the right 
also apply to patients with “serious medical con­
ditions,” to patients who “cannot afford potential­
ly life­saving treatment,” or to patients whose 
physicians believe “marijuana for medicinal pur­
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poses . . . is potentially life saving?”3 In other 
words, there is no principled reason to restrict 
the constitutional right the majority created to 
either terminally ill patients or to post–phase 1 
drugs.
discussion
The facts as illustrated by stories of patients dying 
of cancer while trying unsuccessfully to enroll in 
clinical trials are compelling, and our current 
system of ad hoc exceptions is deeply f lawed. 
The central constitutional issue, however, rests 
primarily on determining whether this case is or 
is not like the right­to­refuse­treatment case of 
Nancy Cruzan, a woman in a permanent vegeta­
tive state whose family wanted tube feeding dis­
continued because they believed that discontinu­
ation was what she would have wanted. I do not 
think Abigail Alliance is like Cruzan. Rather, it is sub­
stantially identical to cases involving physician­
assisted suicide, in which a terminally ill patient 
claims a constitutional right of access to physi­
cian­prescribed drugs to commit suicide.
The Supreme Court has decided, unanimously, 
that no right to physician­prescribed drugs for 
suicide exists.9,10 There is no historical tradition 
of support for this right. And although the right 
seems to be narrowly defined, it is unclear to 
whom it should apply — why only to terminally 
ill patients? Don’t patients in chronic pain have 
even a stronger interest in suicide? Why is the 
physician necessary, and why are physician­pre­
scribed drugs the only acceptable method of sui­
cide? None of these questions can be answered 
by examining the Constitution.11
Similarly, in Abigail Alliance, the new constitu­
tional right proposed has no tradition in the Unit­
ed States, and it cannot be narrowly applied. For 
example, why should a constitutional right apply 
only to people who have a particular medical 
status? And why should a physician be involved 
at all? If patients have a right to autonomy, why 
isn’t the requirement of a government­licensed 
physician’s recommendation at least as burden­
some as the requirement of the FDA’s approval 
of the investigational drug? And why would the 
Constitution apply only to investigational drugs 
for which phase 1 trials have been completed? 
Why not include access to investigational medical 
devices, like the artificial heart, or even to Sched­
ule I controlled substances, like marijuana or ly­
sergic acid diethylamide (LSD)? If it is a constitu­
tional right, these should be available too, at least 
unless the state can demonstrate a “compelling 
interest” in regulating them.
My prediction is that after rehearing this case 
en banc, the full Circuit Court will reject the po­
sition of the Abigail Alliance for the same rea­
sons that the Supreme Court rejected the “right” 
of terminally ill patients to have access to physi­
cian­prescribed drugs they could use to end their 
lives.9-11 To decide otherwise would entirely un­
dermine the legitimacy of the FDA. Patients in 
the United States have always had a right to re­
fuse any medical treatment, but we have never 
had a right to demand mistreatment, inappropri­
ate treatment, or even investigational or experi­
mental interventions. This will not, however, be 
the end of the matter. After the physician­assist­
ed–suicide cases, the fight appropriately shifted 
to the states, although so far only one, Oregon, 
has provided its physicians with immunity for 
prescribing life­ending drugs to their competent, 
terminally ill patients.12 In the Abigail Alliance 
case, the debate will continue in the forum in 
which it began — the FDA — and in Congress.
congress
Congressional action also had its birth with the 
story of one patient with cancer and was also 
heavily influenced by another individual patient 
involved in a controversy over removal of a feed­
ing tube. “Terri’s Law” was enacted in Florida in 
2003 to try to prevent the removal of a feeding 
tube from Terri Schiavo; the case was substan­
tially similar to Cruzan. Terri’s case gained nation­
al attention 2 years later.13 In the midst of it, in 
March 2005, the Wall Street Journal asserted, in an 
editorial titled “How About a ‘Kianna’s Law’?,” 
“If Terri Schiavo deserves emergency federal inter­
vention to save her life, people like Kianna Karnes 
deserve it even more.”14 At the time, Kianna Karnes 
was a 44­year­old mother of four who was dying 
of kidney cancer. Her only hope of survival, ac­
cording to the editorial, was to gain access to one 
of two experimental drugs in clinical trials, but 
neither of the two companies running the trials 
(Bayer and Pfizer) would make the drugs avail­
able to her on a compassionate­use basis. This 
was because, according to the Wall Street Journal, 
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the FDA “makes it all but impossible” for the 
manufacturers “to provide [drugs] to terminal pa­
tients on a ‘compassionate use’ basis.”14
Almost immediately after the editorial was 
published, both drug manufacturers contacted 
Kianna’s physicians to discuss releasing the drugs 
to her. But within 2 days after publication, she 
was dead. The Wall Street Journal editorialized, “Isn’t 
it a national scandal that cancer sufferers should 
have to be written about in the Wall Street Journal 
to be offered legal access to emerging therapies 
once they’ve run out of other options?”15 It not­
ed that Mrs. Karnes’ father, John Rowe — him­
self a survivor of leukemia — was working with 
the Abigail Alliance on a “Kianna’s Law.” That 
law, formally titled the “Access, Compassion, Care, 
and Ethics for Seriously Ill Patients Act” or the 
“ACCESS Act,” was introduced in November 2005 
and is an attempt to make it much easier for seri­
ously ill patients to gain access to experimental 
drugs.16,17
The act begins with a series of congressional 
findings, including that “Seriously ill patients 
have a right to access available investigational 
drugs, biological products, and devices.” The act 
permits the sponsor to apply for approval to make 
an investigational drug, biologic product, or de­
vice available on the basis of data from a complet­
ed phase 1 trial, “preliminary evidence that the 
product may be effective against a serious or life­
threatening condition or disease,” and an assur­
ance that the clinical trial will continue.17 The 
patient, who must have exhausted all approved 
treatments, must provide written informed con­
sent and must also sign “a written waiver of the 
right to sue the manufacturer or sponsor of the 
drug, biological product, or device, or the physi­
cians who prescribed the product or the institu­
tion where it was administered, for an adverse 
event caused by the product, which shall be bind­
ing in every State and Federal court.”17
Although Congress is the proper forum to ad­
dress this issue, this initial attempt has some of 
the same problems as the Abigail Alliance decision: 
the patients to whom it applies are ambiguously 
classified, and clinical research seems to be equat­
ed with clinical care. Also troubling is that the 
patients (and would­be subjects) are asked to as­
sume all of the risks of the uncontrolled experi­
ments, and current rules of research — which 
protect subjects by prohibiting mandatory waiv­
ers of rights — are jettisoned, with the require­
ment of such waivers becoming the price of ob­
taining the investigational agent from an otherwise 
reluctant drug company.
fda proposal
In direct response to Abigail Alliance, the FDA pro­
posed amending its rules to encourage more drug 
companies to offer their investigational drugs 
through compassionate­use programs.4 These pro­
grams first came into prominence during the 
early days of infection with the human immuno­
deficiency virus (HIV) and AIDS, when there were 
no effective treatments and AIDS activists insist­
ed that they have early access to investigational 
drugs because, in the words of their inaccurate 
slogan, “A Research Trial Is Treatment Too.”18 
Because the FDA could not stand the political 
pressure generated by the activists, the compas­
sionate­use program was developed as a kind of 
political safety valve to provide enough exceptions 
to save their basic research rules. In early Decem­
ber 2006, the FDA continued this political­safety­
valve approach by issuing new proposed regula­
tions with a title that could have been taken 
directly from the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Pow­
er (ACT­UP): “Expanded Access to Investigational 
Drugs for Treatment Use.”19
The FDA’s expanded­access proposal applies 
to “seriously ill patients when there is no com­
parable or satisfactory alternative therapy to diag­
nose, monitor, or treat the patient’s disease or 
condition.” 4 Manufacturers are required to file 
an “expanded access submission,” and the prod­
uct must be administered or dispensed by a li­
censed physician who will be considered an “in­
vestigator,” with all the reporting requirements 
that role entails.3
Whether or not the proposal is adopted, it will 
do little to increase access, since the major bottle­
neck in the compassionate­use program has nev­
er been the FDA. The manufacturers have no in­
centives to make their investigational products 
available outside clinical trials. This is because 
direct access to investigational drugs by individu­
als may make it more difficult to recruit research 
subjects, and thus to conduct the clinical trials 
necessary for drug approval, and could also sub­
ject the drug manufacturer to liability for serious 
adverse reactions. Even without a lawsuit, a seri­
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ous reaction to a drug outside a trial could ad­
versely affect the trial itself.4,16,20 The drug com­
panies are right to worry that the approaches of 
the judiciary, Congress, and the FDA will prob­
ably make clinical trials more difficult to con­
duct, because few seriously ill patients who have 
exhausted conventional treatments would rather 
be randomly assigned to an investigational drug 
than have a guarantee that they will receive the 
investigational drug their physician recommends 
for them. This could result in significant delays in 
the approval and overall availability of drugs that 
demonstrate effectiveness — a result no one fa­
vors. Even if patients with cancer are willing buy­
ers, drug manufacturers are not willing sellers.
physicians and patients
The cover story for all the proposed changes is 
patients’ choice. But without scientific evidence 
of the risks and benefits of a drug, choice can­
not be informed, and for seriously ill patients, 
fear of death will predictably overcome fear of 
unknown risks. This is understandable. As psy­
chiatrist Jay Katz, the leading scholar on informed 
consent, has noted, when medical science seems 
impotent to fight nature, “all kinds of senseless 
interventions are tried in an unconscious effort to 
cure the incurable magically through a ‘wonder 
drug,’ a novel surgical procedure, or a penetrating 
psychological interpretation.”21 Another Wall Street 
Journal article, entitled “Saying No to Penelope,”22 
illustrates the impossibility of limiting access to 
unproven cancer drugs to competent adults. The 
article tells the story of 4­year­old Penelope, who 
is dying from neuroblastoma that has proved re­
sistant to all conventional treatments. Her par­
ents seek “anything [that] has a prayer of saving 
her.” In her father’s words, “The chance of any­
thing bringing her back from the abyss now is 
very low. But the only thing I know for sure is 
if we don’t treat her, she will die.” With Penelope 
hospitalized and in pain, her parents continue 
“searching Penelope’s big brown eyes for clues as 
to how long she wants to continue to battle for 
life.”
It is suggested that the requirement of a phy­
sician’s recommendation can safeguard against 
“magical thinking” and help make informed con­
sent real.23 But as Katz has noted, although phy­
sicians (and, he could have added, drug compa­
nies) often justify such last­ditch interventions as 
simply being responsive to patient needs, the in­
terventions “may turn out to be a projection of 
their own needs onto patients.”21
government and the market
Another recurrent theme is the belief that gov­
ernment regulation is evil, a central tenet of the 
laetrile litigation of the 1970s. The court hearing 
Abigail Alliance was correct to note that laetrile 
never underwent a phase 1 trial, but every indica­
tion was that the drug, also known as vitamin 
B17, was harmless, albeit also ineffective against 
cancer. Laetrile became a legal cause celebre in 
1972, when California physician John A. Richard­
son was prosecuted for promoting laetrile. Rich­
ardson was a member of the John Birch Society, 
which quickly formed the Committee for Freedom 
of Choice in Cancer Therapy, with more than 100 
committees nationwide.24 It took another 7 years 
before the FDA prevailed in its case against lae­
trile before the Supreme Court.8 The basic argu­
ments against FDA regulation remain the same 
today: the FDA follows a “paternalistic public 
policy that prevents individuals from exercising 
their own judgment about risks and benefits. If 
the FDA must err, it should be on the side of 
patients’ freedom to choose.”25
public polic y
The FDA will prevail again today, not only be­
cause there is no constitutional right of access to 
unapproved drugs but also because even if there 
were, the state has the same compelling interest 
in approving drugs as it has in licensing physi­
cians. From a public policy view, the Abigail Alli-
ance court, the Congress, and the FDA all seem 
to be suffering from the “therapeutic illusion” in 
which research, designed to test a hypothesis for 
society, is confused with treatment, administered 
in the best interests of individual patients.21,26,27 
Of course there is a continuum, and it is perfectly 
understandable that many patients with cancer, 
told that there is nothing conventional medicine 
can do for them, will want access to whatever is 
available in or outside the context of clinical tri­
als. But this is a problem for patients, physicians, 
the FDA, and drug manufacturers. First, because 
terminally ill patients can be harmed and exploit­
ed, there are better and worse ways to die.21,26 
Second, it is only through research, not “treat­
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ment,” that cancer may become a chronic illness 
that is treated with a complex array of drugs, 
given either together or in a progression.28,29 The 
right to choose in medicine is a central right of 
patients, but the choices can and should be lim­
ited to reasonable medical alternatives, which 
themselves are based on evidence.
This is, I believe, good public policy. But it is 
also much easier said than done.30 Death is 
feared and even dreaded in our culture, and few 
Americans are able to die at home, at peace, 
with our loved ones in attendance, without seek­
ing the “latest new treatment.” There always 
seems to be something new to try, and there is 
almost always anecdotal evidence that it could 
help. This is one reason that even extremely high 
prices do not affect demand for cancer drugs, 
even ones that add little or no survival time.31,32 
When does caring for the patient demand pri­
mary attention to palliation rather than to long­
shot, high­risk, investigational interventions? Coet­
zee’s Mrs. Curren, who rejected new medical 
treatment for her cancer and insisted on dying at 
home, told her physician, whom she saw as “with­
drawing” from her after giving her a terminal 
prognosis — “His allegiance to the living, not 
the dying” — “I have no illusions about my con­
dition, doctor. It is not [experimental] care I need, 
just help with the pain.”1
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